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Essay-How Copyright Got a Bad Name For Itself
Jane C. Ginsburg*
Over the last several years, copyrighted works have come to account for a
healthy portion of our GNP, and an even more substantial share of U.S. exports. 1
Nonetheless, copyright is in bad odor these days. Many of the developments over
the last years designed to protect copyright have drawn academic scorn, and
intolerance even from the popular press. 2 I have a theory about how copyright got
a bad name for itself, and I can summarize it in one word: Greed.
Corporate greed and consumer greed. Copyright owners, generally perceived to

*
Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University
School of Law. This Essay is based on a lecture given at the 10 1h Annual Fordham International
Intellectual Property Conference, and at a faculty workshop at DePaul University College of Law. It has
benefited from the insights of Professors Jessica Litman, Graeme W. Austin and Henry Monaghan.
Many thanks as well for suggestions and research to Sam Lambert, Columbia Law School class of 2002,
and for additional research to Carolyn J.Casselman, Columbia Law School class of 2003.
1. See, e.g., Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Proper, in China and the Former Soviet
Union and its Effects Upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1,35 (1998)
("Approximately twenty-five percent of American exports consist of intellectual property."); Copyright
Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995),
LEXIS 96 CIS H 52136 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, U.S. Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks), ("As a result of the strong protection afforded by our copyright law, the U.S. copyright
industry has become one of the largest and fastest growing parts of the U.S. economy. The U.S.
copyright industry contribute[s] more to the U.S. economy than any other manufacturing industry and
comprises almost four percent of the nation's Gross Domestic Product. Further, the annual growth rate
of the core copyright industries has been more than twice the growth rate of the whole economy."); id.
(Charlene Barshefsky, Deputy United States Treasurer, testifying that U.S. copyright-based industries
contribute over $30 billion in foreign sales and are growing at twice the annual rate of the economy);
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 104817, LEXIS 97 CIS 52142 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) ("Intellectual property is ...our second
largest export; it is an area in which we posses[s] a large trade surplus."); id. (statement of Bruce A.
Lehman) (In 1994, "the U.S. copyright industry contributed approximately $40 billion in foreign sales to
the U.S. economy.").
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001); SIVA VIADHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF

How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001); James Surowiecki, The
FinancialPage: Righting Copywrongs, NEW YORKER, January 21, 2002, at 27 (on The Future of Ideas);
Daniel Zalewski, Thinking These Thoughts Is Prohibited, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, § 7, at 10
(reviewing Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons In a Connected World
(2001)) ("Lessig's passionate new book.., argues that America's concern with protecting intellectual
property has become an oppressive obsession."); Copyright Forever?, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2002, at
A 18 (criticizing copyright term extension, which was "pressed by an assortment of influential and deeppocketed copyright owners").
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
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be large, impersonal and unlovable corporations 3 (the human creators and
interpreters-authors and performers-albeit often initial copyright owners, tend to
vanish from polemical view), have eyed enhanced prospects for global earnings in
an increasingly international copyright market. Accordingly, they have urged and
obtained ever more protective legislation, that extends the term of copyright 4 and
the development and dissemination of consumer-friendly copying
interferes with
5
technologies.
Greed, of course, runs both ways. Consumers, for their part, have exhibited an
increasing rapacity in acquiring and "sharing" unauthorized copies of music, and
more recently, motion pictures. 6 Copyright owners' attempts to tame technology
notwithstanding, such developments as compression formats, high speed lines, and
peer to peer networks, particularly popular on college campuses, recast Annie
Oakley's anthem from "Anything you can do, I can do better," 7 to "Anything you
can steal, I can steal more of." At least some of the general public senses as
illegitimate any law, or more particularly, any enforcement that gets in the way of
what people can do with their own equipment in their own homes (or dorm rooms).
Worse, they would decry this enforcement as a threat to the Constitutional goal of
promotion of the Progress of Science, and thus a threat to the public interest.
In this formulation, the "public interest" is doing a lot of work, not all of it
persuasive. The "public interest" does not mean the personal interest of members
of the public in getting works of authorship without paying for them. This is as
much a perversion of the Constitutional copyright clause as is the
anthropomorphically nonsensical, but infinitely self-serving, adage "Information
wants to be free." 8 But neither is every legal protective measure that a copyright
3.

See, e.g., Steven Levy, The Great Liberator, WIRED Oct. 2002 p. 140 (denouncing the

"copyright machine"). Representative F. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis), Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee and an active force in setting the agenda of the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property, has been especially critical of U.S. music industry groups, calling them
"copyright cartels" and arguing that consumer access to online content should be "expanded, not

restricted." Bill Holland, Groups Offer Views on Copyright, BILLBOARD, Apr. 20, 2002, at 3; Bill
Holland, Although Hearing Approaches, Sensenbrenner Keeps Mum, BILLBOARD, May 12, 2001, at 1.

The recent oral argument before the Supreme Court of Eldred v. Ashcroft, challenging the 1998
extension of the term of copyright, provided further opportunity for vitriolic metaphor. See Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002).
amended by 122 S.Ct. 1170 (2002). Comparing copyright owners to industrial polluters, a law school
professor recently characterized the ongoing struggle with entertainment companies as -like the
environmental movement before 'Silent Spring."' Amy Harmon, An Uphill Battle in Copyright Case,

N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at C4.
4. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
5. See "anticircumvention" provisions of Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201
(2000).
6.

See, e.g., Greg Wright, Online Music Sites: Some Pay, Others Play, TIMES UNION (Albany),

Mar. 14, 2002, at P21, available at LEXIS Gannett News Service, Newsfile (discussing appeal of free
music on the intemet); Dawn C. Chmielewski, Lots of Contenders to Fill Void Left by Napster, TIMES
available at LEXIS Knight Ridder, Newsfile (reviewing sites that
UNION (Albany), Sept. 16, 2001, at I1,
facilitate downloading music, in addition to "movies, books, music videos and pictures").
7.
8.

IRVING BERLIN, Anything You Can Do, in Annie Get Your Gun (1946).
Compare James Glieck, I'll Take the Money, Thanks, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 4, 1996,

available at http://www.around.com/copyright.html,

explaining that "information

doesn't want
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owner urges in the name of authors' Constitutional interest in "securing ...the
exclusive Right to their ...Writings" 9 a guarantor of the Progress of Science. In

fact, the "public interest" in a balanced copyright system that provides meaningful
incentives to first authors, while allowing second authors room to build on their
predecessors' endeavors, as well as reasonable leeway for autonomous consumer
enjoyment, has come in for considerable battering by both copyright owners and
users.
Rhetoric has supplied a heavy cudgel in the battering. Copyright owners and
users have both appropriated words' desirable associations, while endeavoring to
endow them with improbable, indeed, contrary, meanings. Consider "sharing."
Before Napster, sharing meant giving something up so that others could enjoy the
object with which the sharer parted. That is why "sharing" is something children
do not like to do. That is also why "sharing" was laudable; it implied the selfless
improvement of the lot of others. But Napster brought us a new kind of "sharing,"
one in which recipients could enjoy the giver's munificence, while the giver never
had to give anything up. This kind of "sharing" did not require transfer of the
giver's copy of the copyrighted work; the giver simply made it possible for the
recipients to make more copies. Everyone benefited; everyone, that is, except the
creators and owners of the copied works. Or, as the much-maligned Lars Ulrich of
"Metallica" quipped, "Sharing's only fun when it's not your stuff."' 0
Admittedly, Napster's appropriation of the "sharing" language was not entirely
cynical, as the software protocol on which Napster was built was already known as
"peer-to-peer file sharing." But that term stems from the practices of resear, h
scientists who shared information and results of their own devising; they did not
acquire and distribute the fruits of others' labors without the laborers' express or
implied authorization." Whatever the term's genesis, "file sharing" A la Napster
was simply unpaid copying for personal enjoyment. So understood, the activity
lacks moral luster. But call it "sharing," and it glows with the beneficent
associations of the word in its original altruistic guise. Accordingly, copyright
owners' attempts to stop it seem churlish and Scrooge-like.
Users and their commercial facilitators, however, are not the only parties fairly
charged with linguistic humbug. Copyright-owner industries, too, should bear their
share of shame for verbal abuse. In particular, over-depiction of "piracy" as the
unauthorized copying by end-users not only distorts but trivializes the term. 12 Even

anything," to how people say: "Iwant information to be free."
9.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.8.
10.

J.D. Considine, MTV Awards: Outre Attire, Insider Jokes, BALT. SUN, Sep. 8, 2000 at IE

(reviewing a skit at the MTV Awards involving Lars' Ulrich's views on Napster).
11. See, e.g., Todd Sundsted, A New Fangled Name, But an Old and Useful Approach to

Computing (tracing early peer applications to USENET user groups and FidoNet bulletin board
service), at http://www- 106.ibm.com/developerworks/java/library/j-p2p/ (on file with Columbia Journal
for Law and the Arts): Kurt Kleiner, Free Speech, Libert,, Pornography, NEW SCIENTIST. Mar. 10,
2001, at 32 (noting that although the term "P2P" currently embodies a wide variety of networking
options which bypass a central server, file sharing began with the internet, "itself ...a peer-to-peer
system in which university and government mainframes swapped information as equals").
12. For a more extensive critique of copyright owners' rhetorically excessive use of "piracy," see,
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after the means of copying became available to the mass market, "piracy" still
meant large-scale copying and sale to the public by for-profit actors. For example,
individuals engaged in home taping for private use were not "record pirates"; that
term designated commercial intermediaries. 13 Indeed, Congress amended the
Copyright Act in 1992 to make clear that an infringement claim could not be
brought "based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of [a digital or analog
recording] device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog
musical recordings."' 14 Similarly, in the "Betamax" case, the Supreme Court ruled
that a more modest kind of private copying-time-shifting
of free broadcast
15
television programs-constituted fair use.
This analysis does not mean to suggest that all private copying is infringementimmune. In fact, the cumulative economic impact of private copies, particularly if
the copying becomes widespread and systematic, may be quite deleterious, and
should be prevented. Nonetheless, to call private copying that falls outside the
scope of fair use or the statutory exemption in the Audio Home Recording Act
"piracy" is to wield a verbal bludgeon that ultimately discredits the condemnation.
Equation of carefree home taping Peter Pans with professional bootlegging
Captains Hook is more likely to instill resentment and hostility on the part of those
who see themselves in the former role than to inspire their respect for authors'
rights. Worse yet, it may make the real pirate's acts seem less blameworthy.
This Essay does not attempt a comprehensive review of recent U.S. copyright
legislation and caselaw. Instead, it offers an analytical framework that will allow
me to be both informative and opinionated. I propose first to expose some
examples of the kind of copyright owner overreaching that has correctly given
copyright a bad name. I then will argue that not all the bad publicity is deserved.
Rather, much of the last years' legislation and caselaw, instead of overreaching,
appropriately reaches out to address new problems prompted by new technologies,
so as to strike a happier balance between the copyright owner's, the intermediary's,
and the end-user's interests (or greeds). This in turn will permit our legal system to
continue to afford a hospitable environment for the creation and dissemination of
works of authorship, to the ultimate enrichment of the public.

e.g.,

Jessica Litman.

The

Demonization of Piracy 7-8,

at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/

papers/demon.pdf (April 6, 2000), (on file with Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts); Jessica Litman,
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 349 (2002) (describing the expansion of "piracy" to

describe "any unlicensed activity," including "things that are unquestionably legal piracy-like making
the recordings expressly privileged under § 1008 of the Audio Home Recording Act").
13. See, e.g., Goldstein et. al. v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 549-550 (1972) (superceded by statute)
(describing "'record piracy" as the unauthorized duplication and subsequent sale to the public of
commercially available sound recordings of major musical artists); H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 2 (1971),
reprintedin 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567 (clearly targeting commercial intermediaries as the subject
of amendment granting federal copyright protection to sound recordings and characterizing "record
pirates" as those who "can and do engage in widespread unauthorized reproduction of phonograph
records and tapes").
14.

17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).

15.

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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I. WHAT COPYRIGHT DID TO GET A BAD NAME FOR ITSELF
High up on the list is the 1998 Sonny Bono Term Extension Act, 16 which added
20 years to the term of current and future copyrights. As a result, copyright now
endures for a term of 95 years from publication, or 70 years following the death of
the author. Thus, for example, a work first published in 1923, whose copyright
would have expired in 1998, will now be protected until the end of 2018. This
prompts the question whether a copyright is forever. Nowadays it just keeps going
and going and going ...A challenge to the term extension was argued to the U.S.
Supreme Court in October 2002.17 In lieu of legal argumentation regarding that
case, I advance a moral point: the more superannuated a work becomes, the more
its protection seems a drag on the system and on new authors, particularly when the
benefits to old authors are nonexistent or exceptionally attenuated. As a result, the
moral claims of copyright, as a system designed to promote and compensate
creativity, lose plausibility. I strongly doubt the extra 20 years do much for authors
(past or future), especially since the term extension law did not provide for their
vesting in the authors' heirs. 18 But the additional 20 years do, I believe, put
pressure on the system to offset the gain in years with a diminution in the scope of
protection, for example, through a more vigorously implemented fair use exception,
not only during the last 20 years, but perhaps throughout the copyright term. 19
Let us turn now to the topic of copyright and technology, a love-hate
relationship I might subtitle, with apologies to Tom Lehrer, as doing the
"masochism tango." 20 Last year, in a prominent forum for the discussion of
international copyright issues, some participants suggested that the players in the
debate over technological means of committing or forestalling copying were all
paranoid, each suspecting the other of bottomless malevolence in their respective
endeavors to control or to liberate copyrighted material. 21 The self-destructive
dance between copyright owners and technology entrepreneurs is hardly new, as
developments from piano rolls to videotape recorders attest. 22 Nor is today's
16.

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, P.L. No. 105-298 [S. 505], (112 Stat.) 2827

(1998).
17.
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub norn Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122
S. C. 1062 (2002), amended by 122 S. Ct. 1170 (2002).
18.
Authors, or their heirs, enjoy a termination right only if they failed to exercise their right to
terminate the 19-year "extended renewal" term installed under the 1976 Act. See Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(d) (2000).
19.
See, e.g., Joseph Liu, Copyright and Time. A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3032 1](proposing more fair use for older
works); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that an
expansion of permitted unauthorized uses over the duration of copyright is consistent with both private
incentive and public interest objectives).
20.
TOM LEHRER, The Masochism Tango, on AN EVENING WASTED WITH TOM LEHRER (Lehrer
Records 1959).
21.
See Commentary and Panel Discussion: Is the Balance Right for Copyright in an Internet
World?, in 7 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 61-1, 61-5 to -8 (Hugh
Hansen, ed.) (remarks of Bernard Sorkin and Pamela Samuelson) (2002).
22.
See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1622-26 (2001).
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invective significantly more strident, as even a glance at the legislative history of
24
23
the 1909 Act mechanical license, or recollection of the furor over the Betamax,
demonstrate. I think that recent years' evolution, from the unfortunate lawsuit
seeking to bar sales of the "Rio" portable MP3 player, 25 to the misguided Hollings
bill that would mandate anticopying technology for consumer electronics,26 offers
more of the same. It suggests that some copyright owners, if not paranoid, are
Pavlovian in their response to new means of making copies or communicating
works. I don't mean to say that no copyright-owning dog can learn new tricks, but
neither do many copyright owners, particularly the larger ones, appear to be leaping
to unleash these technologies' potential. In this debate, appearance counts a lot;
and, whatever their conduct in fact, many copyright owners appear-or are
portrayed by some vigorous detractors in the academy and in the popular press-as
hell-bent on stomping out both new technology and the scientists and entrepreneurs
27
behind it.
Recent caselaw offers many other examples of perceived copyright owner
overreaching; I will limit myself to two: Reverse Engineering and Parody. The
first adds to the technology controversies the distasteful sauce of anti-competitive
conduct. What, after all, has the reverse engineer done? He has made an
intermediate copy of the targeted work's otherwise unavailable source code, in
order to learn how to make an independent but compatible or competing product.
As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, most other copyrighted works by their nature
disclose the information necessary to create a new work that complements or even
competes with it. 28 Because most computer programs are disseminated only in
object code, however, that information remains hidden; its extraction requires
copying, even if the product that results from that extraction does not. Using
copyright to suppress information does not cast copyright owners in an attractive
light.
By the same token, infringement claims against parodies make copyright owners
look not only power-hungry, but exceedingly humorless. The claim against The
Wind Done Gone, Alice Randall's counter-story to Gone with the Wind,29 was

23.
24.

See, e.g., id. at 1626-27.
See, e.g., JAMES LARDNER,

FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE VCR

WARS (1987); Sony, MCA Square Off Before Supreme Court. BROADCASTING,. Oct. 10. 1983. at 88

("Copyright owners can't tell the public what it can and can't do if they want to make a profit.")
(quoting Sony lawyer)); Robert Sangeorge, Billions at Stake in "Betamax" High Court Case, U.P.I.,

Oct. 4, 1983 available at LEXIS U.P.I. Newsfile (quoting lawyer suggesting that "the studios want to
Iget all the Betamaxes on the market and disembowel them' so they cannot record off-the-air
television"); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 15-168 (1982) (testimony of Jack Valenti, President of

the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., in which he argues that "the VCR is to the American
film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone").
25. RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
26. S. 2048, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. (2002).
27. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1, and infra note 32.
28. See, e.g., Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sony v. Connectix,
203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000).

29.

Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257 (11 th Cir. 2001).
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particularly ill-advised. Not only was it a public relations disaster, but its
resolution, finding fair use, may open the door to assertions that "cultural icons" are
free game for alternative retellings. 30 The Lord of the Rings per Gollum, or Harry
Potter recounted from the point of view of Voldemort, anyone?
Given this litany of lamentable actions by copyright owners, it helps to recall
that in most of these cases, the courts held that no infringement had occurred
because the fair use privilege sheltered defendants' activities. 31 Thus, fears that
copyright had become the land of the "incredible shrinking" fair use doctrine have
proved premature if not unfounded. 32 In other words, The System still Works.
With that observation, I turn to the second theme of this Essay: that over the last
several years, copyright law has often appropriately reached out to address new
problems, many of them prompted by new technologies, in a way that sensitively
endeavors to balance multiple interests.
II. MORE REACHING OUT THAN OVERREACHING
Let's start with the dreaded Digital Millennium Copyright Act. While § 1201's
prohibition on circumventing technological protection measures has drawn much
criticism, 33 three of the DMCA's four statutory innovations have received far less

30.

See John T. Aquino, Whose CharactersAre These, Anyway?, WASH. POST, May 19. 2002. at

B04 (discussing The Wind Done Gone and Lo's Diary to illustrate the uncertainty of the law with
respect to borrowing from works that have become a part of common culture); David D. Kirkpatrick.
Court Halts Book Based on 'Gone With the Wind,' N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 21, 2001, at Al

(reviewing

arguments by defendant's counsel and experts that the retelling of Gone With the Wind serves "a
legitimate public interest partly because of the novel's unique status as an American icon"); Donna
Rifkind, Don't Stand So Close; Lolita, Then and Now, NEW TIMES L.A., Dec. 2, 1999 (quoting Dmitri

Nabokov's query in the preface to Lo's Diary as to whether "icons of popular culture ... [will be] made
subject to plundering by free riders because they have entered the common consciousness").
31.
See also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1540 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (endorsing Sega
and vacating lower court decision for failing to properly instruct the jury on the issues surrounding fair
use); DSC Communications Corp v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (N.D. Texas
1995); (holding that "when good reason exists for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a
copyrighted program, disassembly for the purpose of study or examination of the disassembled program
constitutes fair use"); Mitel, Inc. v. lqtel, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (D. Colo. 1995) (following Sega
and finding intermediate copying to ensure compatibility of long distance call control technology to be
fair use); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (stating that parodies that target the copied work
may well be fair uses, but remanding for determination if copying was too extensive): Leibovitz v,
Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (advertisement for "Naked Gun 33 1/3: The
Final Insult" parodying Annie Leibovitz' celebrated photograph of Demi Moore held fair use); but see
Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) ("the Cat Not in the Hat" by
"Dr. Juice," satire of the O.J. Simpson trial held not a fair use parody in part because Dr. Seuss' works
were not the object of the satire).
32.

Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freel,

60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 151 (1998) (describing fair use in the context of educational copying as "an
incredible shrinking affirmative defense," swiftly being "compacted into ineffectuality by profit minded
copyright owners, whose 'neutral' desire to maximize revenues fosters intense opposition to the doctrine
of fair use").
33.
See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001): Julie E. Cohen. WIPO Copyright
Treaty Implementation iti the United States: Will Fair Use Surive?, 1999 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236

(1999); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy. 108 YALE L.J. 1661 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Mostly
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attention in the annals of opprobrium. This is because they either respond to
requests from constituencies other than copyright owners, or because they more
successfully balance the interests of copyright owners, users, and intermediaries.
First, § 512-Online service provider liability: The substantial immunity for
mere conduit access providers, 34 and the notice-and-take-down system for host
service providers, 35 largely favor telecom intermediaries. If the service providers
follow the statutory safe harbor rules, they will not be liable for damages. The
system set in place arguably disfavors unauthorized postings, as service providers'
incentives are to take down rather than defend the public availability of the
material. But recognizing that the threat that notice-and-take-down could be
abused and thus degenerate into a means to secure private injunctions, the statute
also requires copyright owners who receive a counter-notice from the offending
subscriber to institute suit, or see the material reposted.36 In this respect, I suggest
that the U.S. provisions are more balanced than their EU analogue, as the ECommerce Directive provides for notice and take down, but no put back.37
Second, another relatively uncontroversial DMCA feature is its extension to
webcasting of the compulsory license provisions of the 1995 Digital Performance
Right in sound recordings. 38 That said, however, setting the compulsory license
rates has proved somewhat daunting. The rates that the Copyright Arbitration
Royalty Panel initially proposed3 9 have been rejected by the Copyright Office,40
following an outcry from smaller webcasters hard put to pay the fees. 4 1 The
Copyright Office's response indicates its sensitivity to the concern that the

Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 193

(2000); L. Ray

Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y USA 365 (2000); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the DigitalEconomy: Why Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need

to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Yochai Benkler, The Battle Over the Institutional
Ecosystem in the Digital Environment, Comm. of the ACM, Feb. 2001, at 84; Pamela Samuelson, Good
News and Bad News on the Intellectual Property Front, Comm. of the ACM, Mar. 1999, at 19.
34.

17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a), (j).

35.
36.

Id. §§ 512(c), (g), (j).
id. § 512(g).

37.
See Council Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the InternalMarket, Council Directive 00/31 EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) adopted on

8 June 2000 and published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on 17 July 2000; M.
Yakobson, Copyright Liability of Online Service Providers After the Adoption of the E.C. Electronic
Commerce Directive: A Comparison to U.S. Law 11:7 ENT. L. REV. 144, 146 (2000); Lucy H. Holmes,
Note and Comment, Making Waves In Statutory Safe Harbors: Reevaluating Internet Service Providers'
Liability for Third-Party Content and Copyright Infringement, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 215
(2001).
38.
See 17 USC § 114(d)(2).
39.
See http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-rates.html (CARP report filed Feb. 20, 2002).
40.
See In the Matter of Digital Performance Rights in Sound recordings and Ephemeral

Recordings,
Docket
No.
2000-9
CARP
DTRA
I &2,
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting-rates-order.html.
41.
See, e.g., Katharine Mieszkowski, Web Radio's Last Stand, SALON.COM, March 26, 2002,
available at http://www.salon.comltech/feature/2002/03/26/web-radio/?x (last visited July 28, 2002)
("Webcasters ... say the rate structure is far out of balance to the economics of these tiny, often oneperson operations."); Mara Schwartz, Radio Daze: A New Royalty Structure Could Silence Small-time
WebcastersforGood, NEW TIMES L.A., May 9, 2002.
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wonderful diversity of niche audiostreaming that the web can foster should not be
financially compelled to yield to the homogenizing transmissions of the better-fed
entities. At the same time, the sound recording producers and performers whose
works are webcast should be compensated for this kind of public performance.
This is particularly true for smaller labels and for performers who self-record:
smaller webcasters may well be more likely to communicate their works than are
mainstream webcasts made simultaneously with radio broadcasts. As public
performance rights may become an increasingly important source of revenue,
particularly relative to record sales,42 an appropriate scale of webcasting royalty
rates is crucial both to those who create and to those who communicate the
recorded performances. It remains to be seen whether the revised rate the
Copyright Office has now set4 3 will reconcile both objectives. 44
Third, § 1202-Copyright Management Information presents the too-often
overlooked piece of the DMCA's regulation of technological measures. While
some critics see digital rights management as the gateway to digital lockup, 45 not to
mention Big Brother, 46 I believe that it is worth emphasizing that § 1202 governs
42. See, e.g., Brian Garrity, Uneasy Alliance Forms at Plug.In, BILLBOARD, July 20, 2002, at 8
(attributing nascent relations between record labels and digital music companies to an environment in
which "physical album sales are in serious decline ...and the major labels are becoming increasingly
willing to experiment with digital distribution in an effort to develop new revenue streams"); Hearing of
the Senate Judiciarv Committee, Copyright Royalties: Where Is the Right Spot on the Dial for
Webcasting?, FED. NEWS SERVICE, May 15, 2002 (testimony of Hilary Rosen, President and CEO of the
Recording Industry Association of America, in which she argued that new revenues from digital public
performance rights "are more important than ever in a world where new technologies are dramatically
changing the way people get and listen to music"); H.R. Rep. No. 107-274, at 12 (1995) (observing, as
need for legislation securing digital performance rights in sound recordings, that "[t]rends within the
music industry, as well as the telecommunications and information services industries, suggest that
digital transmission of sound recordings is likely to become a very important outlet for the performance
of recorded music in the near future").
43. See 37 C.F.R. § 261, at 45,240 (2002).
44. The Small Webcasters Act of 2002, passed in the House in early October but still pending in
the Senate as of the time of publication, would suspend for six months the rates and terms set by the
Librarian of Congress for such digital performance. Without the bill, the Librarian's rates will take
effect October 20, 2002, retroactive to 1998, and potentially spur the shutting down of small webcasters.
An appeal of the Librarian's decision is currently before the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of
Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,239 (July 8, 2002) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. § 261), appeal docketed, No. 02-1245 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2002). Small Webcasters Relief Act,
HR 5469, 107th Cong. (2002); 148 Cong. Rec. H7043-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002).
45. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and The Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1089, 1094 (1998) ("[D]igital rights management regimes will enable information providers to
appropriate far more protection against copying and distribution than intellectual property law now
provides."); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws? 73 CHI-KENT L. REV.
1155, 1186 (1998) (suggesting that the "technological ability to restrict access to information, and
information asymmetries, provide information suppliers with an inherent advantage over users," and that
furthermore, "information suppliers set consumers' agenda by releasing particular informational works
and withholding others").
46. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89
GEO. L.J. 2029, 2041 (2001) (cautioning that digital controls are the result of a market-driven quest for
information, unconstrained by physical division of public and private spheres, and therefore "if the state
wants this information, or if a third party wants to use state process to compel its production, it is harder
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information identifying the work's provenance and the conditions of sale or license;
it covers neither access and copying controls, nor personal information regarding
users. 4 7 Accurate licensing information should substantially reduce tracing and
transaction costs. Section 1202's prohibition against knowing removal or tampering
with copyright management information should, accordingly, make that
information more reliable; 48 reliability in turn promotes intermediary and end user
interests, as well as copyright owner interests, by facilitating e-commerce and by
helping to ensure the authenticity of digitally distributed works. I persist in hoping
that section 1202 will also afford an indirect means to advance authors' rights of
attribution and integrity. After all, the author's name is one element of Copyright
Management Information, and arguably, altering the work so that it no longer
corresponds to its description in49the copyright management information is a kind of
tampering with the information.
Fourth, §1201-Technologicalprotection measures: the DMCA prohibits the act
of circumventing technological measures that control access to copyrighted
works. 50 It also bars "trafficking" in devices primarily designed to achieve that
objective. 5 1 Many excruciatingly detailed and endlessly lobbied exceptions to the
prohibition on circumvention follow, but their very specificity precludes resort to
more open-ended, flexible exceptions such as fair use. 52 Moreover, courts have
concluded that Congress intended that preclusion. Congress was persuaded that the
relative security of a closed list of exceptions would encourage copyright owners to
make works available over digital networks. Were the law to allow leeway for
hacking, copyright owners then would lack incentive to offer more varied and less
expensive forms of access to and enjoyment of copyrighted works. 53 For example,
to argue against that result if the information, presumptively relevant, is already there"); Julie E. Cohen,
Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 185 (1997) (arguing that "technologies that monitor reading, listening, and
viewing habits represent a giant leap-whether forward or backward the reader may decide-toward
monitoring human thought").
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(8) (in prescribing elements of copyright management information, the
Register of Copyrights "may not require the provision of any information concerning the user of a
copyrighted work").
48. Though the prohibition may be too weak, see, e.g,, Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116
(C.D. Cal. 1999) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

no violation of § 1202 when defendant's index framed plaintiffs photographs in a way that omitted the
copyright management information); Thron v. Harpercollins Publishers. 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1221, 30 Media
L. Rep. 2279 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that purported copyright
management information was found to be invalid and that plaintiff's claim furthermore lacked evidence
of intentional removal of such information); Ward v. National Geographic Society, 208 F. Supp. 2d 429,
449 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's DMCA claim on the grounds that evidence failed to
establish that publisher knew the copyright management information published with plaintiff's
photograph to be false).
49.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 137, 158-59 (1999) (elaborating on this argument, but also pointing out its shortcomings).

50.
51.

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A).
Id. § 1201(a)(2).

52.
Id. §§ 1201(d)-(j).
53.
See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673, 680-683 (2000); Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 & n. 13 (2d Cir.
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today, most popular music is made available as a package of songs on a hardcopy
CD. (That is, when users haven't acquired it by other means such as Napster or its
successors.) As a result, consumers often end up purchasing 10 or 12 songs, of
which only one or two have any appeal. Moreover, though purchase of the CD
permits unlimited listening, many purchasers may listen to their CDs only very
rarely after the first hearings. One can see the attraction of marketing music as
individual songs, on a pay-per-listen, or keep-it-for-a-week basis. And the cost
would no longer be the $15 charged for the CD, but, say $1 for the week. But this
system only works if keep-it-for-a-week doesn't turn into forever, through
circumvention of the technological measure that makes the song disappear after a
week.
On the other hand, not all circumvention may occur simply for chiseling or other
nefarious purposes. And it is possible that, by ruling out fair use in favor of a list
of specified exceptions, Congress may be foreclosing activities that seem legitimate
even if unlisted. This Essay is not the occasion for detailed review and criticism of
the provisions on access controls. 54 For present purposes, however, it suffices to
suggest that the statute's built-in safety valve of triennial Copyright Office
rulemakings on available non-infringing uses may counteract tendencies to digital
lockup. 55 For the moment, despite much apprehension, little concrete evidence of a
56
diminution of fair use and other non infringing activities has been submitted.
Turning from legislation to litigation, I will not here discuss Napster,5 7 as I
addressed that decision and some of its implications in an earlier volume of this
Journal. 58 Rather, I briefly consider Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 59 a more recent Ninth
Circuit decision, which I believe strikes an encouraging balance between fostering
the dissemination of information via the Internet on the one hand and securing the
author's interest in the economic potential of digital distribution for her work on the
other. Kelly, a photographer whose website displayed his works and offered copies
via paid download, sued Arriba Soft, the developer of an Internet index of images.

2001) (1201's legislative history "clearly refutes" arguments for broad fair use exception: Congress
"eschew[ed] the quick fix of simply exempting from the statute all circumventions for fair use") (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2. at 25, 36 (1998)). For a rejected minority view, see Copyright Legislation
for the Digital Millennium, supra note 48 at 151-52 (contending that § 1201(c) nonetheless allowed

room for a fair use defense to access circumvention).
54.

See Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the DigitalMillennium, supra note 49, at 137-55.

55. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C)-(D).
56. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64.556-58 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §
201). See also Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to § 1201(a) on ground that fair use has not been held to be constitutionally
mandated, and that in any event, "Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to
copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user's preferred technique or in the format of the
original."); United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d I I1(N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to § 1201 (b) on similar grounds).
57. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
58.

See Jane C. Ginsburg. Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &

ARTS 1.22-24, 29-42 (2000).
59. 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cit. 2002).
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Arriba drew the index from a database that it had created by crawling and copying
photographic images on the web. Arriba then converted the images to lowresolution "thumbnails" that it would make available in response to search requests.
This index, as the first to search and retrieve by image rather than by word, offered
a highly desirable innovation. But that is not all the index did. It also allowed the
user to click on the thumbnail to see an enlarged, higher-resolution image.
According to the Ninth Circuit, Arriba Soft did not copy the higher-quality image
into its website, but rather framed its website around the image as it appeared on
60
the originating photographer's site.
In applying to digital communications the exclusive right under § 106(5) to
authorize the "public display" of visual works, 6 1 the Ninth Circuit held that Arriba
had prima facie infringed Kelly's copyrights in the photographs Arriba framed as
well as those that it copied into its index. The court then held that the copying and
display of the thumbnail images was fair use, because the use was primarily
informational and did not substitute for purchase or commercial exploitation of the
images. Put another way, the public benefit of the new and non competing
informational use outweighed the copyright owner's interest in controlling copying.
By contrast, the display of enlarged higher-resolution images did not constitute fair
use because it competed with the photographer's market for digital downloads of
his works. The higher-quality photos may have enhanced, but they were not
necessary to the information-communicating function of the index; by contrast,
their availability via defendant's site allowed the public to bypass plaintiffs own
presentation of his photographs. Although the court did not allude to the
photographer's "moral rights" interest in preserving the artistic integrity of his
work, 62 the Ninth Circuit's ruling may be seen as a determination that a third party
framing technique that obliterates or obscures the visual and informational context

60. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that no copying had occurred may be questionable, at least
under the doctrine of "RAM copying" announced in the Ninth Circuit's decision in MAI v. Peak, 991
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), as the framed image creates a temporary copy in the memory of the user's
computer. The court's perception that no prima facie actionable reproduction occurred through the
framing, however, should be encouraging to those who fear that the doctrine of RAM copying will bring
every act of digital use within the copyright owner's exclusive right of reproduction. See, e.g., Anthony
Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the Controversy over RAM

"Copies," 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 84 (arguing that the doctrine of RAM copying "threatens to create
significant problems as more and more works are used in digital form and has the potential to give
copyright owners excessive control over the use of their works"); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with
Overlapping Copyrights On the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 578 (1997) (hypothesizing an

"absurd result" of a literal application of the RAM copying doctrine in which "copyright owners will
literally shut down the Net by enforcing the rights the courts have declared they have"); Pamela
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 4, 1996, at 134 (vigorously opposing the NIl White
Paper proposal creating an "exclusive right to read" based on the RAM copying doctrine).
61. For a pre-Kelly discussion of the § 106(5) display right and its application to digital
communications, see R. Anthony Reese, supra note 60.

62.

On moral rights and their protection in U.S. law, see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Have Moral

Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 9 (2001); Gerald
Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 229 (1995); Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A
Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (1984).
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in which the author set her work is not "fair." Seen in this light, the decision may
signal sensitivity to the potential prejudice to authors of undisclosed digital
remanipulation of their works.
III. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelly v. Arriba Soft, I believe, appropriately
balances the public interest in the vibrant development of the Internet as a tool for
locating information on the one hand, with protecting authors' emerging digital
markets (and perhaps her artistic integrity) on the other. One may hope that the
decision heralds a happy accommodation of owner/user interests in digital
communications that should prove more complementary than antagonistic.
How happy the outcome will be in fact for owners and users, or their
commercial intermediaries, will in the end depend on whether these actors can keep
their greed in check. Both sides can wield greed-gratifying technology to copy and
distribute, or to lock up, works of authorship. But, despite some intemperate
portrayals in academe and in the popular press, copyright law, both statutory and
caselaw, has often intervened to temper owners' and users' more porcine
inclinations. Decisions like Campbell v. Acuff-Rose and Suntrust ("The Wind Done
Gone") warn copyright owners that they cannot privatize popular culture, at least
not to the extent of keeping the work and the social context for which it has come
to stand, free from trenchant, even raucous, criticism. Decisions like Kelly and
Napster remind users and intermediaries that the technological ease of making and
distributing copies does not of itself justify supplanting the author's online market
opportunities. And the DMCA, whatever its many imperfections, endeavors to
foster a digital environment in which enhanced security encourages the digital
release of works, and limitations on service provider liability promote their broad
circulation.

